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Once widely supported, the ‘‘war on
drugs’’ has become increasingly contro-
versial, as the political realization sinks in
that it has wrought more harm than good.
The Global Commission on Drug Policy,
a collection of eminent former heads of
state, businesspersons, and diplomats,
bluntly declares that ‘‘the war on drugs
has failed,’’ while simultaneously ‘‘[gener-
ating] widespread negative consequences
for societies in producer, transit and
consumer countries’’ [1]. The European
Union’s Reuter-Trautmann report wither-
ingly finds ‘‘no evidence that the global
drug problem was reduced’’ following the
intensified criminalization of drug abuse
and trafficking in the late 1990s, and that
the ‘‘enforcement of drug prohibitions
has caused substantial unintended harms;
many [of which] were predictable’’ [2].
That prohibitionist drug laws often
impede treating addiction or reducing its
harms is already familiar to the public
health community [3–5]. However, it is
less well recognized that these same failed
policies of the war on drugs inflict tre-
mendous collateral damage on the treat-
ment of one of the most common ailments:
pain. Not just addicts, but arguably most
of the world’s population are victims of the
failed war on drugs.
Current estimates suggest that upward
of 80% of the world’s population lacks
access to basic pain relief [6]. Paradoxi-
cally, those 80% are mostly in poorer
countries, and their need for pain relief
is heightened by a relative absence of
curative care such as surgery, or treatment
for both communicable and non-commu-
nicable diseases causing pain (e.g., HIV/
AIDS, cancer) [7]. There are many
reasons for this disturbing health inequity
(e.g., difficulties in procurement, lack of
prescribing knowledge among health pro-
viders), but the fundamental, often over-
looked reason is the cumbersome, restric-
tive drug laws and policies that exist at
international, national, and local levels.
We call the legal barriers ‘‘fundamental’’
because where laws forbid access to pain
relief, that prohibition trumps all other
reasons for the inequity.
Two treaties contain the foundation for
many national drug control laws: the 1961
United Nations Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs [8], and the 1971 Con-
vention on Psychotropic Substances [9].
Both these international laws are overseen
by the International Narcotics Control
Board (INCB), whose mandate is split
awkwardly between promoting and con-
trolling narcotic and psychotropic drugs
and precursor chemicals [10]. On the one
hand, INCB is responsible ‘‘to ensure that
adequate supplies of [narcotic and psy-
chotropic] drugs are available for medical
and scientific uses,’’ but on the other hand,
it is supposed to identify ‘‘weaknesses in
national and international control sys-
tems’’ and to muster pressure on govern-
ments to stanch illicit uses of these same
drugs. The INCB is basically in the
conflicted position of both promoting and
throttling the drugs it regulates.
Last year, the president of INCB
admitted that the two sides of his legal
mandate are out of balance: while much
attention goes to prohibiting the produc-
tion, supply, and use of illicit controlled
substances, ‘‘equal emphasis has not been
placed on the other fundamental objective
of the treaties of ensuring that [licit]
controlled substances are available for
medical and scientific purposes’’ [11].
Credit must be given to INCB for
recognizing this problem, but it also
cannot be overlooked that the imbalance
is largely the INCB’s own fault. A system
of ‘‘annual estimates’’ administered by the
INCB imposes legal limits on the amount
of controlled substances that countries can
lawfully import. Thus, while INCB con-
cedes that the global consumption of licit
narcotics for therapeutic purposes is inad-
equate [12], actually its own legal regime
is implicated as a cause [13].
The 2011 ‘‘Estimated World Require-
ments for Narcotic Drugs’’ [14] published
by INCB provides a chilling illustration of
how this institution entrenches health
inequities, while ostensibly fighting illicit
drugs. Under Article 21 of the Single
Convention, INCB estimates are legally
binding and tantamount to quotas for each
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possess. These estimates are based on the
country’s own prediction of its pain treat-
ment needs for the projected year, frequent-
ly using data on the number of treatments
consumed in thepreviousyear[15].Thus,a
country that consumed low amounts of
drugs in previous years can become trapped
in a cycle of reduced access in subsequent
years, divorced from any epidemiological
measure of actual clinical need.
Figure 1 presents the per capita annual
entitlement of morphine in different coun-
tries relative to gross national income, based
on 2011 INCB morphine annual estimates
[14] and the World Bank’s current data
on population and gross national income
[16–18]. The data used are available in
Table S1. Figure 1 shows clearly that low-
income, lower-middle-income, upper-mid-
dle-income, and high-income countries
have radically different access to pain
treatment under INCB annual estimates—
often as much as several hundred fold
different. By median, countries in these
groups have a per capita entitlement to
morphine of 0.502134 mg, 0.530478 mg,
3.131495 mg, and 16.876496 mg, respec-
tively. Similar inequities exist for the other
controlled narcotics.
Common sense holds that such large
per capita differences between rich and
poor countries cannot correspond accu-
rately to the epidemiological prevalence of
clinical pain. We twice wrote INCB
requesting it explain the methods used in
deriving and ensuring the quality of its
annual estimates, but received no reply.
Some argue that the INCB system of
estimates should not be blamed for causing
any health inequity, because the Single
Convention allows countries to revise and
supplement their annual estimates of
Summary Points
N The 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, implemented by
the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), is still the legal foundation for
international control of both licit and illicit narcotic drugs, and involves a
binding system of ‘‘annual estimates’’ (i.e., quotas) on the amount of controlled
narcotics that countries can acquire.
N In practice the Single Convention and the INCB’s prohibition mandate greatly
outstrips its access mandate.
N The INCB has frequently approved quotas of controlled narcotics grossly
insufficient for the epidemiological prevalence of clinical pain, thus leaving
millions of patients legally prohibited from accessing palliation such as
morphine.
N Given the INCB’s decades-long failure to administer the supply of controlled
narcotics in accordance with clinical need, we propose that all legal
responsibility for licit narcotics for medical and scientific purposes be shifted
to the World Health Organization.
Figure 1. Grams of morphine per capita versus gross national income. Based on 2011 INCB morphine annual estimates [14] and World Bank
data on population and gross national income [16–18]. Countries excluded because of incomplete data: American Samoa, Anquilla, Aruba, Ascension
Island, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Christmas Island, Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Cook Islands, Curacao, Equatorial
Guinea, Falkland Islands, French Polynesia, Faeroe Islands, Gibraltar, Greenland, Guam, Isle of Man, Kuwait, Korea Dem. Rep., Kosovo, Liechtenstein,
Mayotte, Monaco, Montserrat, Myanmar, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New Caledonia, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, Qatar, San
Marino, Saint Helena, Sint Maarten (Dutch Part), Somalia, South Sudan, St. Martin (French part), Tristan de Cunha, Turks and Caicos Islands, United
Arab Emirates, Virgin Islands (US), Wallis and Fatuna Islands, West Bank and Gaza.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001153.g001
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argument, however, lacks evidence. If
annual estimates were really so flexible,
then surely in its 50-year history at least
some poor countries should have arrived
at estimates sufficient to meet clinical
needs. Yet the data show that not even a
single low-income country, not even those
having generalized epidemics of HIV/
AIDS and ably furnishing antiretroviral
treatment, now possesses more than a
derisory quota under law for furnishing
pain treatment. A doctor, hospital, or aid
donor who dared furnish pain treatment
beyond the quota would break the law.
In short, the data clearly illustrate that
lack of equity and progress in the ‘‘war on
pain’’ is not due to a few countries lacking
the infrastructure to properly use or
estimate their needs for controlled narcot-
ics, but is caused by the systemic and
enduring failure of INCB to fulfill its
mandate in ‘‘assisting Governments in
achieving, inter alia, a balance between
supply and demand’’ [10]. Were INCB
serious about achieving balance, it would
reject the ludicrously low estimates for
pain medicines that it now routinely
approves for poor countries—as low as 1
gram/year of morphine for a whole
country in some cases [14,19].
It is in public health emergencies,
however, that INCB’s estimates are the
most punishing and deplorable for health.
The chronic shortage of analgesics in
Haiti—whose population of 9.7 million
people is allocated only 671 grams of
morphine, 117 grams of codeine, 83 grams
of fentanyl, and 309 grams of pethidine—
became acutely intolerable after the Jan-
uary 2010 earthquake forced amputations
to be performed without anesthesia or
post-operative analgesia [20]. To address
this, a full week after the earthquake, the
INCB issued a diplomatic note advising
countries that narcotics exports to Haiti
could proceed ‘‘even in the absence
of…import authorizations’’ normally re-
quired by the Single Convention [21]. But
INCB’s legal interpretation was flagrantly
wrong: under Article 21(4)(b)(ii) of the
Single Convention, which governs emer-
gencies, import authorizations continue to
be required as normal pursuant to Article
31(5). With Haiti’s government interred
under the rubble, obviously no import
authorizations could be forthcoming.
The Haiti earthquake, in other words,
put INCB in the clumsy position of urging
governments to unlawfully violate the
Single Convention’s rigid rules for import
authorizations—something governments
may or may not be willing to do, but
surely an argument that the Single Con-
vention is ill-considered, dangerous to
public health, and overdue for amend-
ment.
Regrettably, many national govern-
ments appear to have followed INCB’s
example of not balancing narcotic drugs
with the demands of public health [22].
Governments may restrict the types of
narcotics that are available, the route by
which they can be administered, or the
setting in which they can be delivered. In
Iran, for example, morphine is not a
registered medicine, and tablets are un-
available in the regular market, which all
but eliminates the possibility of receiving
adequate analgesia in the community
rather than the hospital [23]. In Jordan,
a prescription for morphine is valid for
only ten days for cancer patients, and
three days for other patients, placing an
impractical burden on patients and the
health care system to renew prescriptions
constantly [23,24].
It is now timely to rebalance drug
policy, so that the requirements of pain
patients for licit narcotics are met [25].
Pain has to be viewed not just as a clinical
problem in need of better treatment
modalities, but as a social problem in need
of wiser international and national poli-
cies, laws, and institutions. The Single
Convention is 50 years old, so there can be
no argument that reassessing it is prema-
ture, or that global circumstances have not
changed. At the time it was written (in
1961) tertiary care and pain control was
commonplace in only a handful of rich
countries, and none of the countries that
are today recognized as ‘‘emerging’’ (e.g.,
Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South
Africa). With the demographic transition
now underway in these countries and
aging populations worldwide, it is all but
certain that the incidence of non-commu-
nicable diseases that require opioid anal-
gesics during treatment or palliative care
shall increase. The health inequities pro-
duced by the Single Convention’s system
of estimates are therefore poised to
worsen, unless there is a corrective inter-
vention.
Regrettably, INCB has already tried,
and failed, to initiate reform from within.
Nearly two decades ago (in 1994), INCB
carried out an assessment of the effective-
ness of its treaty regime [26] in which it
noted that the ‘‘[treaty objective] of
ensuring an adequate supply of narcotic
drugs, especially opiates used for medical
purposes, has not been universally
achieved’’ and that little of the world’s
morphine (20%) was consumed in devel-
oping countries. Yet strikingly, INCB
concluded from this evidence that it did
‘‘not appear necessary to substantially
amend the international drug control
treaties,’’ and instead, INCB merely
exhorted countries ‘‘never [to] hinder
the availability of drugs for legitimate
medical purposes.’’
Fifteen years later, INCB’s considered
decision to choose exhortation over treaty
reform has proved resoundingly unsuc-
cessful, and the inequitable, inadequate
supply of controlled narcotics for pain
control persists. With INCB having
botched that corrective opportunity so
badly, it would be naı ¨ve to entrust INCB
with spearheading other corrective inter-
ventions in the future. The need to
relocate the legal framework and respon-
sibilities to a different institution is irrefut-
able.
We propose amending the Single
Convention so as to transfer the part of
INCB’s mandate and funding that deals
with licit controlled medicines to the
World Health Organization (WHO). Do-
ing so would more closely integrate that
public health function with WHO’s exist-
ing efforts to improve access to essential
medicines, rational prescribing, and
health system strengthening [27–29].
There is no doubt that the mandate fits
within WHO’s legal competences, for
WHO’s constitution gives it the authority
‘‘to perform such duties as may be
assigned’’ by treaty and ‘‘to act as the
directing and co-ordinating authority on
international health work’’ [30]. Trans-
ferring the public health responsibility for
controlled medicines from INCB to
WHO would end the impossibly contra-
dictory situation in which INCB is
mandated both to restrict and to promote
access to controlled medicines, while also
putting an agency with competence and
commitment to health equity in charge.
Certainly WHO is the better agency to
accurately estimate the epidemiological
need for pain control and to coordinate
emergency interventions such as Haiti’s.
In conclusion, the war on pain, much
like the war on drugs which eclipses it, is a
failure, and a strict prohibition mind-set
has served neither. Five decades after the
Single Convention, and two decades after
the INCB initiated its last ineffective
attempt at reforms, it would be exceed-
ingly naı ¨ve not to conclude that this
experiment has run its course. Attention
must now shift to creating better legal
frameworks that extricate pain treatment
from drug prohibition, and that formally
transfer some responsibilities and funding
from INCB to WHO, so that health equity
plays a part in narcotics control policy. To
reject this conclusion is to continue
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org 3 January 2012 | Volume 9 | Issue 1 | e1001153embracing a cruel system in which persons
needlessly lack treatment for pain, for the
stubborn pursuit of narcotics prohibition,
which others have found no longer
desirable.
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